The impact of Greek labour market regulation on temporary employment – evidence from a survey in Thessaly, Greece by Anagnostopoulos, Achilleas D. & Siebert, William
 
 
The impact of Greek labour market regulation on
temporary employment – evidence from a survey in
Thessaly, Greece
Anagnostopoulos, Achilleas; Siebert, William
DOI:
10.1080/09585192.2015.1011190
License:
Other (please specify with Rights Statement)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Anagnostopoulos, AD & Siebert, W 2015, 'The impact of Greek labour market regulation on temporary
employment – evidence from a survey in Thessaly, Greece', International Journal of Human Resource
Management, vol. 26, no. 18, pp. 2366-2393. https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2015.1011190
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management on
25 Feb 2015, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09585192.2015.1011190.
Eligibility for repository : checked 16/04/2015
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 1 
Published online International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25 
February 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2015.1011190 
 
The impact of Greek labour market regulation on temporary employment - 
Evidence from a survey in Thessaly, Greece 
 
 
Achilleas D Anagnostopoulos
a
 and W S Siebert
b c *
 
a 
School of Business and Economics, TEI of Larissa, Larissa, Greece; 
b 
Business 
School, University of Birmingham, UK; 
c
 IZA, Institute for the Study of Labour, 
Bonn 
 
 
This paper uses an original dataset for 186 workplaces in Thessaly (central Greece), to 
study consequences of Greece’s strict employment protection law (EPL) and national  
minimum wage for temporary employment. We find higher temporary employment rates 
among  workplaces that pay low wages close to the minimum.. We also find that EPL 
“matters”, in particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temporary 
workers are less protected definitely employ more. Our findings thus support the view that a 
firm’s HRM decisions regarding internal versus external allocation of tasks are influenced 
by labour regulation. 
  
JEL Classification: J38, J41, J81 
 
Keywords: temporary work, Greece, employment protection, national wage 
agreements 
Acknowledgments We thank the editor (David Lepak) and four anonymous reviewers for 
their comments, as well as John Addison, Rebekka Christopoulou, Vassilis Monastiriotis, 
Mary O’ Mahony, Ioannis Papadimopoulos and Konstantinos Tzioumis. We are also 
grateful for valuable suggestions from participants at conferences at the ICIB University of 
Macedonia; Thessaloniki, Kadir Has University, Turkey; London School of Economics, 
Hellenic Obesrvatory; Central Planning Bureau, Netherlands; INDICSER meetings in 
Valencia, Spain and the Work, Pensions and Employment Group, Sheffield, UK. 
The usual caveats apply. The TERS data and questionnaire are downloadable at 
http://teilar.gr/dbData/ErErgo/TERS_FFE.rar 
 
Funding This research has been co-funded by the European Union (European Social 
Fund) and Greek national resources under the framework of the Operational Programme for 
Education and Initial Vocational Training – Research Funding Program:Archimedes I: 
Flexible Forms of Employment in Thessaly Region (MIS:88591/1) 
 
 2 
*Corresponding author. W.S. Siebert. Email: w.s.siebert@bham.ac.uk  
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
The role of labour regulation in protecting insiders at the expense of outsiders is an 
important consideration for policy. Greece provides an instructive case of de jure 
heavy regulation with high wage floors, and strict employment protection laws 
(EPL). Greece also has many SMEs, which might aim to avoid the regulation by 
externalising employment relationships, for example by hiring workers on 
temporary contracts, or as supposedly independent contractors.  Fundamentally, our 
research treats the basic question in strategic HRM raised by Lepak and Snell 
(1999) as to a firm’s “internal” (i.e., core, permanent) versus “external” (peripheral, 
temporary) allocation of work. In particular, we explore whether firms change their 
mix of permanent and temporary contracts in response to Greece’s strict labour 
regulation, basing our analysis on an original survey of employment relations in 
nearly 200 private sector businesses in the Greek province of Thessaly in 2006-7. 
 
While there are several types of temporary contract (see Cappelli and Keller 
2013), we take them together since all remove from the firm the responsibility of 
offering security of tenure. Holders of temporary contracts have fewer employment 
rights, and are less able to enforce them. We follow Eurostat and the OECD by 
defining “temporary” jobs as dependent employment of limited duration (OECD 
2002 Annex 3A; OECD 2014 Box 4.1). The list of job types includes fixed-term 
contracts (with a defined end date), seasonal work, on-call contracts of limited 
duration, project contracts, training contracts and  temporary work agency (TWA) 
contracts (though at the time of our survey TWAs were effectively banned in 
Greece).
1
 In sum, we focus on why firms use any type of the above temporary 
contract, since any of them might represent an “escape” (Olsen and Kalleberg 2004) 
from regulation  
 
The Greek labour market has been performing badly, which gives urgency to 
the search for causes. Table 1 gives a comparative picture of labour conditions in 
panel A, and measures of the regulatory environment in B. The labour conditions 
statistics are averages for 2000-06, with the aim of giving the long-run position, 
well before the recession. Panel A shows severe youth and long-term 
                                                 
1
  The main definitional problem is deciding whether the contractor (or subcontractor or free-lancer) 
is more a regular than a temporary worker. In our survey, we solve this problem by specifically 
asking for numbers of temporary contractors and subcontractors.. 
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unemployment, both almost twice the OECD average, and within this context, the 
organisational flexibility provided by temporary work is important for job creation.  
 
 [Table 1 near here] 
 
The table also shows that Greece’s firms make considerable use of 
temporary work arrangements, which covered 10.5% of the workforce (and 22.6% 
of the unskilled) in the early 2000s. Of course, we might expect high temporary 
employment prevalence in Greece where the seasonal tourist industry is so 
important, and indeed, the Greek figure is similar to the OECD average of 9.3 (and 
remains similar at about 10% in 2011 - see OECD 2014). However, we must 
remember that there are severe obstacles to temporary employment in Greece, 
including a ban on temporary work agencies (only lifted in 2012 – see below), 
which will act as a brake on temporary employment
2
. Moreover, we see that a 
higher proportion of unskilled workers is on temporary contracts in Greece than the 
rest of the OECD, suggesting a two-tier market. Thus, concerns remain. 
  
A tendency to use temporary contracts links to the literature (e.g., Kalleberg 
2000, Kahn 2007, 2010) on the consequences of strict EPL for regular jobs. Greece 
indeed has strict regular worker EPL (Panel B), which could make firms reluctant to 
hire new entrants into regular jobs, but instead to place them in temporary jobs – 
despite the obstacles. Greek firms might indeed have a “repressed” demand for 
temporary workers, which are then not a means of bringing in valuable 
performance-enhancing knowledge (Matusik and Hill 1998) but simply a means for 
micro-firms to survive. Issues of whether such workers have much prospect of 
moving on to permanent employment naturally arise (for similarities with Spain, see 
Ruiz-Santos et al, 2003, and Roca-Puig et al 2012). Ultimately, the issue of whether 
firms manage to use temporary workers despite the laws (or perhaps ignoring them, 
especially for small firms) is empirical, and we will put forward tests below. 
 
                                                 
2
 An instructive further obstacle is the law 1346/1983 requiring re-hiring of hotel seasonal workers. 
Hotels must re-hire at least the average number of employees hired over the last two seasons. A 
sliding scale for hiring according to hotel occupancy is permitted, thus, only 1/3 of the employees 
need be rehired if the hotel has only 20% occupancy, rising to all employees if there is 80%. The 
process is to be monitored by the Labour Inspector. Clearly, this law will reduce a hotel’s hiring of 
seasonal workers, by imposing obligations for future seasons. 
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Greece’s exceptional regulation is shown in panel B, starting with the World 
Bank’s “ease of doing business” index. We see that in 2006, the time of our survey, 
Greece ranked only 109 overall in the ten business policy areas measured, much 
lower than the OECD average
3
. Then, the second row shows that the Greek 
minimum wage floor is higher than the OECD average. The difficulty that the high 
minimum poses for Greek SMEs has long been recognised (see e.g., Kufidu 1999), 
but an additional point is that a wage floor may exacerbate the effects of EPL on 
temporary work as we argue in a simplified model below.  
 
The bottom three rows of Panel B take up the pressure of EPL itself, starting 
with the OECD indices for regular (i.e., open-ended contract) worker EPL and 
temporary worker EPL. We see that EPL in Greece is higher both for regular and 
particularly for temporary workers. The last row then shows the World Economic 
Forum hiring and firing practices index, which is useful because it is based on 
managers’ views, and so should be closer to the de facto position (though employer 
perceptions have been found to be consistent with de jure regulations, see Gaelle 
and Scarpetta 2006). Again, we see that Greece is judged much more on the 
“impeded” side than the average OECD country.  
 
While panel B indicates Greece’s high labour regulation, the question of 
enforcement is controversial. For example, Matsaganis (2007, 542) states that 
amongst SMEs “ informal employment is the norm, enabling many employers to 
flout regulatory constraints on dismissal protection, minimum wage and social 
insurance”. Mihail (2004, 552) even believes that labour law enforcement is 
“obsolete”. Others (e.g. Seferiades 2003, Psychogios and Wood 2010, Kretsos 
2011) make a similar point. Indeed, our own survey (Table 5 below) provides good 
evidence that minimum wages are avoided.  
 
On the other hand, a body of literature supports the view that Greece’s 
regulation has some effect. For example, Kufidu and Mihail (1999. 492) state that 
fixed term contracts are a means of “circumventing one of the most rigid legislative 
regimes concerning employment protection in the EU”. A similar argument is also 
                                                 
3
 Zambarloukou (2006, 215) even classifies the Greek system as “state capitalism”. On the other 
hand, Seferiades (2003) strongly criticises the concept of ease of doing business, pointing out, for 
example, that Greece is a leader in starting businesses. 
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made by Voudouris (2004, 132). In fact, both sides could be right, because while the 
law may be evaded, so long as there is some chance of penalties, firms will react. 
Moreover, the law is more likely to be evaded by the micro (very small) firms, and 
so a distinction between micro and other firms should be informative. The matter is 
therefore testable in principle with our data. 
  
Our research below tests for whether there is a link between managers hiring 
temporary workers, and their views on EPL and the Labour Inspectorate, controlling 
for other important factors such as the firm’s pay and it size. We will hypothesise 
that temporary work is resorted to when these job security and wage regulations or 
“floors” bind in the manager’s view. A particular example is the case of a lower 
paying firm, which cannot afford the national wage or EPL standards, and so may 
attempt to escape these standards by employing temporary workers. For a firm at 
the edge, as it were, the gains to using a temporary contract rather than a permanent 
are greater.  
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the labour 
regulation framework in Greece. We then discuss theoretical determinants of 
temporary worker hiring. The empirical sections follow, where we first give details 
of the Thessaly workplace survey, and then present our measures of the main 
variables. In the last sections, we present the regression results and derive 
implications for the impact of EPL and wage floors, and finally draw some policy 
conclusions for Greece’s post-crisis situation.  
 
2. Labour regulation in Greece 
Let us consider regulation of wages and working conditions in turn. As regards the 
minimum wage, note that we are interested in its effects on HRM decisions within a 
firm rather than wider effects, for example on unemployment (results for Greece 
point to moderate unemployment effects, see Karageorgiou 2004). Within a firm, a 
rise in the minimum wage may prompt a move to save on costs by reducing the 
value of working conditions (see Simon and Kaestner 2004). A high minimum 
could thus be accompanied by lower training, workplace safety, pensions, and also 
low job security. Lower job security could in turn imply substitution of temporary 
for permanent contracts, our focus. 
 7 
 
Here, as with much minimum wage research, the international evidence is 
mixed
4
, but there are at least signs (Kahn 2007) that minimum wages can induce 
substitution of temporary for permanent jobs. The reason is simply that minimum 
wages can intensify the problems associated with EPL by restricting parties’ 
freedom of manoeuvre (see Lazear 1990). In other words, when EPL imposes a 
legal requirement for job security, wages would be expected to fall (Summers 
1989), but if this fall is prevented, then other cost-saving adjustments may be 
sought. One such adjustment could be the replacement of permanent by temporary 
jobs.  
 
In fact, Greece has long had a system for setting high minimum wages via 
extended collective agreements (see Kritsantonis 1998; also see Sotiropoulos, 2004 
on Greece’s “neo-corporatism”). Though there have been recent changes due to the 
recession (see below), the laws prevailing at the time of our survey meant that there 
was a National General Collective Agreement, which set national minimum wages 
every two years, and this minimum could be supplemented by sectoral agreements 
(Zambarloukou 2006, OECD 2011a). The minimum has tended to be high relative 
to average wages by international standards (Table 1), perhaps because provincial 
conditions are not reflected in the negotiations given weak unionisation at local 
level (Matsagannis, 2007; see also Kufidu and Mihail 1999). At the same time, the 
central union movement appears politically influential but not representative, since 
the main union federation (Ioannou 2005) is funded by the state, with tiny member 
contributions. For its part, the employers side has had centralised organisations too 
(see Krisantonis 1998), which are also likely to be unrepresentative, given Greece’s 
long tail of small producers in the provinces. While it is true that the high minimum 
wages have often not been paid, as we acknowledged above (and see Table 5), 
management may still be worried by paying illegally low wages, and hence react 
with extra temporary hiring. Therefore, it is worth gathering (indicative) data on 
whether a workplace’s wages are close to the national and/or sectoral collective 
agreement floor, and testing for this reaction.  
 
                                                 
4
 For example, Neumark and Wascher (2001) find that training is reduced when minimum wages 
increase, with Dustmann and Schonberg (2009) finding the opposite. As for pensions, Marks (2011) 
reports these are reduced as minimum wages increase, but Simon and Kaestner (2004) find little 
effect. 
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Turning to regular worker EPL, again worker protection has a long history, 
and is extensive as is to be expected given Greece’s “Mediterranean capitalism” 
(Psychogios and Wood 2010) with its French civil law tradition. Thus, 
compensation for unfair dismissal was begun in 1920 (see Avdela 1997, Koukiadis 
2009), at about the time that the Labour Inspectorate was established. At the time of 
our survey, Greece’s regular worker EPL was strict (see Table 1), with high 
“procedural inconveniences” according to the OECD’s measurements (2004, Table 
2.A2.1), and a requirement for 6 months pay for compensation for unfair dismissal 
of long service (20 years) workers.. Moreover, protection began after only 2 months 
service (since raised to one year). Importantly, there was no lower firm size limit for 
these payments, so SMEs could also be liable if the employee brought a successful 
case. 
 
Temporary workers have also long been protected, with laws dating from the 
1920s providing for their contracts to become automatically open-ended after a 
given period (Koukiadis 2009). In addition, temporary contracts (EIRO 2001) have 
only been permitted when there are “objective” reasons such as seasonal or project 
work. Temporary work agencies have also been banned. Although the ban was 
lifted in theory in 2001 (Law 2656), large capital requirements and other restrictions 
effectively continued the prohibition. There are thus no temporary agency workers 
in our sample, and few in Greece as a whole to this day (see OECD 2014).A further 
deterrent law (see OECD 2011a, 120), is the requirement to pay a temporary 
employee whose job is terminated before the agreed time all the wages for the time 
remaining until the termination date. Thus, we must bear in mind that the temporary 
worker escape route has never been an easy option in Greece, and this factor needs 
controlling as we do below.  
 
The enforcement of EPL cannot be tight since there are few inspectors, only 
about 400 for the whole of Greece in 2008 (Labour Inspectorate 2008). Indeed, as 
noted above, there has been criticism of enforcement (e.g. Mihail 2004; see also 
OECD 2014b for current criticism). Still, the organisation is by no means moribund, 
and was strengthened in 1998 (EIRO 2001) by Law 2639 which took it from local 
authority control into the direct control of the Minister of Labour.  Hence, the 
Labour Inspectors are likely to retain considerable “negative” power, not least 
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because of their stringent reporting requirements A detailed official annual return is 
required by the Labour Inspectorate, covering numbers employed, hours, wages and 
permanent-temporary contract status. In addition, any substantive change, including 
any new hires or workforce reductions, must be notified to the Inspectorate within 
15 days. 
 
That these reporting duties are taken seriously is indicated by the Annual 
Reports of the Inspectorate. Thus, in 2008 (Labour Inspectorate 2008), about 30,000 
inspections were conducted, €10m of fines levied, and about 800,000 staff lists in 
respect of 2.4m staff were received. Our survey therefore contains questions probing 
manager judgements on the effects of EPL on employment decisions which we can 
then test for actual effects. 
 
3. Theoretical considerations 
Our question is to what extent Greece’s exceptional labour regulation influences 
business decisions on the “internal” versus “external” allocation of work. Following 
Lepak and Snell (1999), we can think of firms as allocating workers to a range of 
tasks, some of which are core to the firm’s objective, and others which are 
peripheral. Core tasks require workers to invest in specific human capital, and these 
workers are trained and developed internally. Here, the full-time permanent contract 
is natural, and indeed, as Autor shows (2003) the worker’s incentive to invest in 
specific skills depends on contractual permanence. On the other hand, peripheral 
tasks primarily support the core, acting as a screening ground from which core 
workers are selected, and in the main simply require routine public knowledge 
skills.  
 
 For the routine skills, higher labour turnover is acceptable, giving 
Atkinson’s (1984) “numerical flexibility”. Hence, “atypical” contracts including 
temporary contracts, agency work, sub-contracting and probationary agreements 
will be common. For specialist skills, bought-in experts or “alliances” are 
appropriate, and all our Greek firms indeed have alliances with accountancy and 
legal firms. The important point is that there is no “best practice” permanent-type 
contract covering all tasks (Lepak and Snell 1999, 42), and we expect a variety of 
contracts.  
 10 
 Building on this foundation, we can argue that a firm rationally decides on 
its most efficient mix of core and periphery tasks and their corresponding contracts, 
including temporary contracts. The mix should also respond to changes in labour 
regulation. Admittedly, there is controversy (e.g., Osterman 2011) over the extent to 
which organizations can truly manage HRM practices to maximise efficiency. Still, 
a basic prediction (see Heywood et al 2011; also Houseman 2001, and Abraham and 
Taylor 1996) is that temporary and other atypical contracts are used in practice to 
buffer the firm against change, and provide the numerical flexibility to protect the 
firm’s core competences and its specific training investments in the core workers.  
 
 Our theory requires that a firm can change its mix of core and periphery 
tasks, which admittedly might be questionable for some contract types. In our work, 
we assume peripheral tasks can be allocated to workers subject to a variety of 
contract types, not only those on fixed term contracts, but also seasonal workers, 
temporary contractors/subcontractors, and trainees and workers on subsidised 
employment programmes. However, while it is reasonable to think of fixed term 
contracts (with a defined end date) as being changed for permanent if circumstances 
require, other contract types such as seasonal work or traineeships point arguably to 
more fixed circumstances. For example, a ski resort (Ainsworth and Purss 2009) is 
inherently seasonal, giving a low ratio of permanent to seasonal workers. The mix 
here appears “technologically determined” and difficult to alter. A similar case 
might be made for trainees (employed especially in construction, for example), who 
cannot simply be switched for skilled workers. This said, there are examples of 
permanent “tied” labour contracts in agriculture (for example, see Basu 2013), 
which is clearly also seasonal. The agriculture example shows that converting 
seasonal to full-year jobs is possible if there is enough incentive. Similarly, more 
trainees can be employed if subsidies increase. Our theory only requires marginal 
changes, which are certainly possible because Greek businesses in practice vary 
considerably in their mix of contracts, as we show below. 
 
 Change can be either unexpected, as with business cycle shocks, or 
expected, as with the need to cover for absences, or seasonal demand fluctuations. 
As regards business cycle changes, evidence is given in the time series studies of 
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) for Sweden, and Wenger and Kalleberg (2006) for the 
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US. Both show temporary and agency worker employment varies more over the 
business cycle than does regular employment, as buffering would predict. As for 
shocks due to absence, Olsen and Kalleberg (2004) link the greater use of agency 
work in Norwegian than in comparable US establishments to the need to cover for 
absences caused by Norway’s generous leave laws. Furthermore, Heywood et al’s 
(2011) study shows how firms adopting family friendly practices such as workplace 
nurseries that reduce absence, also reduce reliance on temporary work. Finally, even 
though seasonality is predictable, so seasonal work is more “permanent” in a sense, 
seasonal workers are precisely a buffer labourforce
5
. Hence, as noted above 
seasonal workers are categorised as temporary by the main statistical organisations 
such as the OECD and Eurostat, a procedure we follow. In sum, the theory that 
organisations rationally employ workers on temporary types of contract as a buffer 
receives support. 
 
 Our next point is that organisations change their mix of core and periphery 
tasks in response to labour regulation. In particular, as we have discussed above, 
when EPL for regular workers becomes stricter and wages are rigid
6
, core staff 
cannot offset their greater cost to the firm by accepting lower wages, and so firms 
have an incentive to hire more workers on unprotected temporary contracts. In fact, 
Autor (2003) predicts that stricter EPL will be felt most by the less skilled core 
workers, who cannot offset the extra costs of stricter EPL by investing in specific 
human capital and becoming more useful to the firm. He finds that 20% of the 
increase in temporary agency work in the US over 1973 to 1995 results from 
increases in regular worker EPL, due to restrictions on the employment-at-will 
doctrine. Other evidence seems consistent, for example with Booth et al’s (2002: 
F184) cross-country research showing that higher regular worker EPL links with 
higher rates of temporary work. They conclude (2002: F184) that this finding is “a 
clear sign that temporary contracts act as a way of providing employment flexibility 
in those countries with severe EPL for permanent jobs.”  
                                                 
5
 This point is demonstrated, paradoxically, by the law 1346/1983 aiming to support continuity of 
employment of hotel seasonal workers. Hotels must re-hire at least the average number of employees 
hired over the last two seasons. A sliding scale for hiring according to hotel occupancy is permitted, 
thus, only 1/3 of the employees need be rehired if the hotel has only 20% occupancy, rising to all 
employees if there is 80%. The process is to be monitored by the Labour Inspector. The complex 
sliding scale shows just how difficult it must be in practice to make seasonal hotel work more stable. 
6
 In a similar vein, Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993: 197) have noted that the internal labour markets in 
large firms have rigid wage structures, so large firms may tend to bring in temporary contract 
workers to provide adaptability. 
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 Turning to Greece, while studies of employment on temporary work 
contractd employment have given some prominence to issues of Greek labour 
regulation, results are inconclusive due to small samples, often of large companies. 
Voudouris (2004) is the only one to have used multivariate statistical methods with 
a sample of 75 large companies. Using a standard model (as in Abraham and Taylor 
1996), she finds that a firm’s output variability is most important in explaining 
temporary worker employment. At the same time, while noting (2004: 132) the 
Greece has a “rigid legislative regime”, the research does not test this. However, in 
the case studies of Mihail (2003 and 2004) managers were asked directly about 
effects of labour law
7
. The results were mixed with managers in 30 very large firms 
employing over 200 (Mihail 2003: 484), being overall neutral as regards “fixed term 
contract restrictions” - though no question was asked regarding regular worker 
restrictions. In a similar vein, the other study of 16 SMEs (Mihail 2004: 559) 
concluded that “small entrepreneurs seem to feel that they enjoy sufficient 
workplace flexibility”, given “the existing framework of informal employee 
relations”. The implication is then that SMEs rely on informality to escape the rules, 
which we can test for below. 
 
 Our hypothesis is that workplaces resort to temporary contracts when 
regulatory constraints concerning wage and working conditions floors bind, holding 
other determinants of temporary work contracts constant. Admittedly, as stressed 
above, there are strict laws restricting the circumstances in which workers can be 
employed on temporary contracts (the role of Labour Inspectors in Greece). These 
restrictions could block the temporary contract “escape route”. We have a question 
in the Thessaly survey to cover this type of protection, and so aim to allow for it. 
Furthermore, we have to take account of the possibility of evasion of the rules 
especially by small firms. The easiest way to make allowance is to analyse micro 
firms separately from the larger firms, and search for differences in behaviour, 
which we do.  
  
                                                 
7
 The recent study by Gialis (2011) if industry in Thessaloniki concludes that numerical flexibility is 
important, but without finding a distinct cause. 
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 In sum, holding other factors equal, standard theory predicts that stricter 
(regular) worker EPL makes employment on temporary contracts more likely. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1. Workplaces that feel more constrained by regular EPL (based 
on answers to our survey questions discussed below), will employ more 
workers on temporary contracts. 
 
 A further factor that needs to be taken into account is wage inflexibility, 
which is relevant for Greece where wage floors are pushed upwards by minimum 
wages imposed by the national collective agreement as explained above. This 
constraint is likely to bear unequally on firms, since the minimum compresses 
wages at the bottom of the distribution as is usual with collective bargaining (see 
Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2007). Hence, high wage firms relying on skilled workers 
will easily pay the minimum, but less productive firms relying on unskilled labour 
will not find it so easy. These firms will then reduce jobs, either shutting unskilled 
workers out of employment completely, or putting them onto temporary contracts 
(Kahn 2007)
8
.  
 
It might also be the case that the minimum wage floor interacts with EPL to 
stimulate temporary employment. The reasoning here has been explained above. 
Briefly, that the minimum wage prevents the parties “contracting around” EPL by 
lowering starting wages. In this situation, EPL “bites” more strongly, thereby 
promoting employment on temporary contracts. Taking these effects together, we 
accordingly propose: 
Hypothesis 2. Workplaces that pay wages closer to the wage floor will employ 
more workers on temporary contracts, given EPL. 
 
 For our empirical procedures, it is necessary to develop measures of the 
pressure of EPL and wage standards. For EPL, we survey employer opinion, which 
not only gives the de facto position, but is also specific to each workplace. Thus, 
                                                 
8
 Abraham and Taylor (1996) originally proposed that high wage (productive) firms would be more – 
not less - likely to employ outside contractors.. They envisaged high wage firms as attempting to cut 
costs by out-sourcing unskilled work. In fact, the evidence from early US studies is not clear (see 
Houseman 2001 and Gramm and Schnell 2001), though Cappelli and Keller’s (2013) recent work 
shows high wage and benefits firms to be less likely to use contingent labour, in line  with our 
hypothesis. This said, the weight of regulation, which may attract low wage firms to temporary 
contracts in Greece, is less relevant in the US, which has much less regulation. 
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even though one law applies to all Greek establishments, we argue that it affects 
each workplace differently, depending upon how each business relates to “the 
system”. For example, some managers will be more experienced in dealing with the 
bureaucracy, or been able to build up a better relationship with the Labour 
Inspector, than others have. Moreover, some firms will be in a better position to 
comply with the laws than others are, colouring the managers’ views of the laws. As 
for wages, data on average pay in a workplace can in principle distinguish those 
workplaces that have little difficulty in paying the minimum, Admittedly, our wage 
data cannot be precise in Greek “grey market” circumstances where many 
employers may avoid the law (see below), but they are indicative.  
 
4. The Survey 
The Thessaly survey aims to investigate employment relations in workplaces in 
Thessaly. It is modelled on the UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey
9
, but 
with modifications for Greek EPL and centralised wage agreements not relevant to 
the UK. It is based on a representative sample of nearly 200 workplaces interviewed 
in 2006-7. Public sector workplaces are excluded, as is agriculture. It includes very 
small workplaces, down to those employing only one worker (see Table 2)
10
. The 
basic sampling frame was the register of businesses maintained by the Thessaly 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. However, since larger companies are 
registered outside of Thessaly, an additional sample was derived from the ICAP 
database of larger firms (also used in Mihail 2003).  
 
 We adopted several strategies to encourage response and maintain 
confidentiality. The 10 interviewers were carefully selected (graduates or Masters 
students from the TEI of Larissa and the University of Thessaly) and trained in a 
three day course. In addition, a pilot survey was conducted with 20 interviews in 
July 2006, which showed the importance of contacting owners/managers with 
plenty of time to arrange an interview appointment in advance, since the 
                                                 
9
  See WERS (2005). The UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey  is a large-scale nationally 
representative survey of employee relations in approximately 2,000 UK workplaces. The first survey 
was undertaken in 1980, and further surveys have been performed every 5 or 6 years since. The 
survey uses an extensive questionnaire directed at workplace managers covering all aspects of 
employee relations, and has been a productive source of material for much UK research on employee 
relations (for a publications list, see WIAS 2010). 
10
 The recent work by Daoli et al (2013), only includes larger workplaces employing more than 10. 
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questionnaire
11
 took about 45 minutes to complete. On initial telephone contact with 
the businesses, the support of the Chamber of Commerce was made known, and the 
nature of the survey questionnaire outlined. Confidentiality was stressed, and to 
avoid embarrassment we decided that questions on rates of pay could not be too 
detailed, and in particular the issue of wages paid below the official minimum wage 
had to be left open (see the discussion of Tables 2 and 3 below).  
 
 Given this system, relatively few refusals were encountered. Of the 347 
workplaces selected from the sampling frame and contacted, full questionnaires – 
apart from wage information - were achieved from 216 based on  interviews with 
the manager/owner/accountant in the last quarter of 2006 and first quarter of 2007. 
30 of these workplaces had to be dropped since they fell below our size limit of at 
least one employee, or would not provide wage information. Thus, our final sample 
was 186 with wage information, a response rate of 54%. 
 
 Since workplace size was not fully under our control in the sampling process 
due to lack of prior information on the size of some workplaces, we then 
constructed probability weights. Our weighting objective was to replicate 
Thessaly’s population distribution of workplace sizes in the Employment 
Observatory Research-Informatics (PAEP 2004) survey as shown in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
 Details of the sample by workplace size are given in Table 2. The first three 
columns show the sample achieved, together with the percentage of temporary 
workers, and the final column shows the population distribution of workplaces. As 
the final column shows, the large majority of private sector workplaces in 
Thessaly’s population of firms (and in Greece generally – see Table 1) are very 
small, 97% being under 10 employees in size. (However, obviously these larger 
firms are vital since that about 40% of the workforce – see Table 1.) We also see a 
tendency for larger workplaces to employ a higher proportion of temporary contract 
workers, which shows the importance of controlling for workplace size, as we do. 
  
                                                 
11
  The questionnaire is available in English and in Greek at 
http://teilar.gr/dbData/ErErgo/TERS_FFE.rar) 
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5. Methods and measures 
Temporary work. Our measure of temporary work includes the different temporary 
contract types shown in Table 3. As noted above, these types bear different 
relationships to a business, but none has security of tenure, and all – with time – 
have the potential of being switched into and out of the core as our theory requires. 
Thus, it makes sense to take them together, though we provide sensitivity tests for 
alternative definitions.  
 
 Table 3 shows average numbers in the various categories, and also 
percentages for the small workplaces employing less than 10 (approximately our 
sample median) and the larger workplaces. The first point to note is that we have no 
temporary agency work contracts since agencies were effectively banned at the time 
of our survey, as noted above. This said, temporary contract types are important, 
particularly in larger workplaces where they average 18.3% of the workforce, 
compared to 10.5% in smaller workplaces - a pattern generally in line with the 
literature
12
). Larger workplaces also have a different pattern of temporary work, 
with the fixed term contract being most prevalent. On the other hand, for smaller 
workplaces, fixed term contracts appear relatively unimportant, and most weight is 
placed on seasonal work contracts, and also use of subsidised workers.
13
 The 
different temporary work patterns for large and small workplaces are largely a result 
of their different industrial sectors, with restaurants (and hence seasonal work) in 
the small-firm sector, and more manufacturing (and fixed term contracts) in the 
larger. The different sectors evidently have characteristic temporary worker types – 
which is a topic for future research. For our present purpose, they show the need to 
control for workplace size in testing our hypotheses, and also to run separate 
analyses for the small and large workplaces, which we will do. Overall, temporary 
work contracts can be seen to absorb a large segment of the Greek workforce, 
higher than the US for example, where recent comparable figures are only around 
5% (Cappelli and Keller 2013, Table 2). 
                                                 
12
  Cappelli and Kessel (2013) find strong size effects for the US, as does Houseman (2001) – but 
Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993) do not. As for Greece, while Voudouris (2004) does not report size 
effects due to lack of size variation in her sample, Kufidu and Mihail’s (1999) study of  large 
companies (over 200 workers) shows a high proportion, 80%, used fixed term contracts, indicating a 
size effect.. 
13
  Typically, the subsidy is based on the employer share of social security contributions being paid 
on behalf of  young workers by the public employment service (see, e.g. OECD 2005). Social 
security contributions are high, amounting to over 30% of gross pay, of which the employer pays 
about two-thirds (OECD 2005, p.103), giving a reduction in labour costs of 15-20%. 
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[Table 3 near here] 
 
The tobit method. As Table 2 shows, even on our broad definition only one-third of 
the workplaces in our sample use temporary workers - though such workers are 
important when used, comprising 41% of the workplace’s employees on average. 
To circumvent this “censoring” problem, estimation is carried out by means of a 
tobit procedure using Stata (Cameron and Trivedi 2009 review the Stata procedures; 
see Batt 2002 for an application). The tobit model can be summarised as follows: 
temp
*
i = β1EPLi + β2Wi + γ’controlsi + εi , and   (1) 
 tempi  = temp
*
i  if temp
*
i > 0, or tempi = 0  if temp
*
i <= 0, 
where tempi  is the percentage of workers on temporary contracts observed in the i-
th workplace, while  temp*i is “latent”, and  εi  is an iid N(0, σ
2
) error term. EPLi =1 
denotes that EPL binds in the i-th workplace in some sense as described below, Wi 
=1 denotes that the wage floor binds, and there is a vector of controlsi as well. 
According to Hypothesis 1, EPL raises temp
*
i, so in this case we would expect β1
 
> 
0. Also, according to Hypothesis 2, W raises temp
*
i, so we would expect β2
 
> 0. 
Since it is possible that the two constraints binding together have an additional 
effect, we could also experiment with a cross-product EPLi×Wi in the equation, and 
a positive coefficient here would support both Hypotheses – though in practice we 
never found this effect to be important. 
 
 The tobit model’s  β coefficients need interpretation. First, a positive β for a 
variable means that the variable increases the percentage of workers employed on 
temporary contracts given that any are employed. The β coefficients need to be 
multiplied in our case by about one-third, the proportion of non-zero observations in 
the full sample, to show this effect. Second, the positive β also means the variable 
increases the likelihood that any workers will be employed on temporary contracts. 
While statistical software (see Baum 2006) is needed to calculate these separate 
effects, the sign of β shows their direction.14.  
 
                                                 
14
  It should also be noted that, the model is estimated by maximum likelihood, which is inconsistent 
if the normality assumption for the error is not in fact correct (Vincent 2010). We therefore use 
robust standard errors.  
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EPL measures. As regards Hypothesis 1, that EPL constraints raise tempi, testing 
requires that we develop measures of these constraints. As noted above, we survey 
manager opinion (following WEF 2010), and so derive three workplace-specific 
indicators for perceptions of EPL within a workplace. The questions are shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. The first was a dummy for whether a manager agrees that hiring and 
firing laws (i.e., EPL) are an obstacle to employing more people (this question is 
used in the European Union’s original survey of EPL – see Emerson 1988). An 
affirmative answer (dummy = 1) should signify a feeling of pressure from EPL (the 
indicator correlates positively with preferring to employ temporary contract workers 
because they are easier to dismiss, 0.187, see Table 7). It should therefore link 
positively with employment of workers on temporary contracts in that workplace. 
The second indicator was a dummy simply for whether the manager prefers workers 
to be placed on temporary contracts because they are easier to dismiss. An 
affirmative answer (dummy = 1) should directly pick up whether the manager feels 
that temporary contract workers are necessary to provide the flexibility that regular 
worker EPL denies. Again, we have a test for Hypothesis 1.  
 
 [Table 4 near here] 
 
 The third EPL indicator we developed from the question, shown in Table 5, 
on whether the manager had taken professional employment relations advice
15
 on 
labour contract issues, that is, dismissals, discipline or renewal of contracts. If 
advice on any of these issues had been sought we set a dummy = 1. Seeking such 
advice might indicate that the manager feels greater constraints from EPL, and 
provide a test of Hypothesis 1. Admittedly, the simple correlation of this indicator is 
negative, -0.181, with the indicator for EPL based on the manager’s preference for 
temporary contract workers because they are easier to dismiss (see Table 7). Still, 
this third variable is worth including because it shows the manager’s real legal 
needs, and might have a role to play in a multiple regression.  
 
[Table 5 near here] 
 
                                                 
15
 Here we follow the Workplace Employment Relations Survey question on “whether you have 
sought information or advice on employment relations issues” from, e.g. external lawyers, external 
accounts or other professional bodies such as employers’ associations or government Small Business 
Service. 
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Finally, it is necessary to control for temporary worker EPL, given Greece’s 
strict legal restrictions outlined above. Our indicator (similar to Mihail 2003) is 
based on whether a workplace manager sees the Labour Inspectorate as strictly 
enforcing the restrictions, by not easily giving permission to employ temporary 
workers (final row of Table 4). In other words, if this dummy = 1, there is 
protection for temporary workers in the manager’s judgement, so resulting in less 
employment of workers on temporary contracts.  
 
Wage floor measures. To test Hypothesis 2, that wage floor constraints raise 
temporary work, we developed two wage variables. First, we formed a dummy for 
whether the workplace paid a majority at (or below) the gross minimum wage of 
€11,000 as set by the national wage agreement. The survey question underlying this 
variable is based on the UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey (2005), as 
shown in Table 6. As noted above, for reasons of confidentiality we could not ask 
directly whether the workplace paid below the minimum, and so the bottom of the 
distribution is truncated. In fact, Table 6 shows a surprisingly large percentage, 64% 
of workers in small workplaces are paid at  the national minimum
16
 (and hence 
many are likely to be paid less). Here we see concretely (Mihail 2004: 550) “the 
ability of Greek SMEs not to comply with labour law regulations”. Nevertheless, 
even if the minimum wage floor is avoided in low productivity workplaces, as noted 
above it is still possible that management will be worried about detection, and react 
with extra temporary hiring in accordance with Hypothesis 2. 
 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
 A further wage floor variable can be constructed (again following the 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2005), based on whether a manager states 
that pay in his/her workplace is determined by the national wage agreement. We 
found that managers in small workplaces stated on average that only 60% of their 
workers were paid according to national and sectoral agreements. “Individual” 
agreements, possibly (illegally) circumventing the national minimum, accounted for 
most of the remainder. However, for larger workplaces, the national and sectoral 
                                                 
16
 These figures are higher than official estimates (Koutsogeorgopolou 1994, p88) of 15-20%, in part 
because we use a gross minimum adding on 16% to cover employee social security contributions, 
rather than a net minimum. In fact, international comparisons (Dolton and Bondiabene 2012) show 
Greece’s wage minimum to be among the highest in the OECD. 
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agreements were more important, with 90% paid according to national agreements, 
indicating closer adherence to the law. From these data, we formed a dummy 
variable indicating whether the national or sectoral agreements determined pay for a 
majority of workers. In the Greek environment, if this dummy = 1, it should also 
indicate the higher paying workplace that is better able to pay nationally agreed 
wages, and more. (Note that low paying workplaces are less likely to pay according 
to the national agreement as Table 7’s negative simple correlation, -0.144, between 
these variables shows.)  This type of workplace is therefore not close to its wage 
floor and should (Hypothesis 2) accordingly employ fewer temporary workers. 
 
The controls. The controls are important since our two hypotheses about the effects 
of EPL and wage floors can only hold when the other factors determining temporary 
employment are allowed for. The controls are most easily discussed in terms of 
Table 7 which gives the means and correlations of the main variables and indicators. 
 
  [Table 7 near here] 
 
 In setting up our controls, we follow mainly the classic Abraham and Taylor 
(1996) specification. In the first place, we require controls for variability of demand, 
which as discussed above increases the use of temporary workers. Here we rely on 
the fact that some industries such as hotels and restaurants face large changes both 
annually and weekly which require a buffer. Hence, we include a set of industry 
dummies. Hires and redundancies over the period (row 10 only shows hires but we 
also include redundancies) might also indicate demand variability. Similar controls 
for longer term variability (for which we control but do not list), are dummies for 
whether the firm has increased part-time or non-routine sub-contract work over the 
past 5 years.  
 
 We also look for controls for the specific training requirements of jobs 
performed in the workplace. The payoff to specific training of temporary workers is 
low, so a business with high training requirements should employ fewer such 
workers. Training requirements can be picked up by variables for the use of part-
timers, and young and old workers (again included but not shown in Table 7), all of 
whom are likely to be in jobs requiring less training and so indicate a business for 
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whom temps may be more suitable. The old worker variable could also indicate 
task/monitoring complexity and be negatively associated with the demand for 
temporary work contracts.  
 
 At the same time, some of these groups, particularly part-timers, are to some 
extent substitutes for temporary workers and family workers, which could give rise 
to a negative link with temporary workers. Low paid workers are also likely to have 
less training, which gives an additional reason for the majority low-paid dummy 
(row 7) linking positively (correlation 0.185 in the 7
th
 row) with temporary workers. 
 
 A further interesting control is the manager’s assessment of workers’ 
commitment at the workplace (see row 11) which could link to the demand for 
temporary workers in two ways. First, a committed workforce is likely to signify a 
business with more complex tasks (needing worker commitment) which will be less 
suited to temporary work contracts. Indeed, Table 7 shows a strong negative simple 
correlation (-0.277) between this variable and the percent of temporary work 
contracts. Second, superior managers may themselves be able to engender 
commitment. Such management will in turn mean greater firm productivity and 
higher pay. Superior management then links in turn to less temporary employment 
via Hypothesis 2, namely that higher paying firms are further from the wage floor 
with more flexibility and less need to use temporary work contracts.  
 
 Finally, we control for firm size (row 12). This control is standard, though 
there are arguments both for and against large firms externalising work. On the one 
hand, larger firms are likely to face a greater variety of problems, and thus may need 
more solutions, of which temporary work contracts could be one. Larger firms’ 
compliance with EPL and wage floors may also be monitored more strictly, thereby 
also prompting a move towards more temporary work contracts. On the other hand, 
larger firms can easily more cover for absences, and are also more likely to have 
unions and government contracts (see Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993)  which could 
work against externalising work. 
 
 Continuing on the theme of firm size, differences between the means of 
small and large firms are shown in the means column of Table 7. Means for small 
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workplaces are shown above, and for large in square brackets below. Proceeding 
down the rows, first we see that small workplaces have lower percentages of 
temporary contract workers, as already noted. As for the EPL variables, we see that 
larger firms are more likely (18% vs. 10%) to prefer temporary contract workers 
because they are easier to dismiss which might indicate higher regulatory pressures 
on the more visible firms. Both size types agree that EPL reduces employment 
(about 50% each, in row 4). However, the larger firms are more likely to take 
contractual (discipline and dismissals) advice as well as wages and tax advice, as 
might be expected. As regards whether the labour inspector is an obstacle for 
employment of workers on temporary contracts, in this case the small firms appears 
more concerned (23% vs. 10%), perhaps because they lack the scale to build up the 
expertise, and can less afford legal advice. 
 
 Moving on to the minimum wage variables, we see a far higher proportion 
of small firms are low paying (55% vs 19), as might be expected. Also, a smaller 
proportion of small firms adhere to the national or sectoral agreements, again 
suggesting they cannot afford these. As for the other variables, we show in row 9 a 
tax variable 
17
which shows that both groups believe that employer taxes reduce 
employment, but this belief is more prevalent (51% strongly agreeing) among the 
hard-pressed small firm group. As for hires, these are much more likely to have 
been made among larger firms, as expected. Finally, as for manager beliefs about 
worker commitment, these are very positive (about 75%) for both groups. Overall 
then, we see good grounds for distinguishing between small and large firms, and 
will do so below. 
 
6. Results 
We now present the regression results, starting with basic results in Table 8, then 
giving sensitivity tests in Table 9. We concentrate on unweighted results, where the 
tobit model passes the tests for normality and homoskedasticity
18
. In fact, Cameron 
and Trivedi (2010, p113) advise that so long as the model has sufficient controls, 
                                                 
17
 Greece has high social security tax rates, as noted above. We collected manager views on whether 
such high NI taxes were an obstacle to employment in the manager’s view. However, though most 
agreed that taxes were high as Table 8 shows, in our regressions the tax variable never had much 
effect. 
18
 Vincent (2010) proposes a test of the tobit assumptions of normality and heteroscedasticity, which 
is available in Stata.. 
 23 
and in particular includes determinants of the sampling frame, the most efficient 
estimator does not use weights. Our survey over-samples larger workplaces, as 
discussed, and all the regressions control for workplace size, so it is reasonable to 
use unweighted regressions. However, for completeness, we also report a model 
below (Table 9) with weighted results, which are not substantively different. 
  
Basic results. We start with parsimonious results. Column (1) gives a model with 
only the controls, to give an idea of how a basic model behaves. The significant 
controls are the industry dummies (not shown individually), the hiring rate, and 
workplace size. Increases in the hiring rate and in workplace size can indicate both 
increased variation in demand, and perhaps also more variability of tasks, so it is 
reasonable that the prevalence of temporary work contracts increases. Part-time 
work enters negatively, indicating substitutability of part-time and temporary work, 
which is plausible – though a similar substitutability with family work is 
surprisingly not exhibited. Also the workforce’s commitment is not negatively 
linked with temporary employment, so the strong simple correlation (Table 7), does 
not survive. In the bottom panel, the McFadden pseudo-R
2
 gives 0.123 of variation 
explained which is acceptable. 
 
[Table 8 near here] 
 
 We now discuss the EPL and wage floor indicators. Column (2) includes 
only these indicators. Here we see that some EPL indicators by themselves have 
significant and large effects discussed in more detail below. The wage indicators are 
weaker, but are important in some specifications in the later columns. In this simple 
model, the explanatory power of the seven EPL and wage indicators as shown is 
0.059, which is lower than the controls in column (1), but it must be remembered 
that this column has more controls, which include 9 industry dummies. 
 
 Moving to the full model in column (3), the first EPL indicator is based on 
whether the workplace’s manager prefers hiring workers on temporary contracts 
because they are easier to dismiss (i.e., are not covered by regular EPL). Column 
(3)’s coefficient, 0.41, shows that comparing a workplace whose manager takes 
such a position (dummy = 1), to one whose manager does not (= 0), the percentage 
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temporary increases by 13 (=0.39×33) percentage points amongst workplaces 
employing temporary workers. (For this “uncensored” group we multiply the tobit 
coefficient by approximately one-third, as discussed.) To this effect, we should also 
add an increase in the probability of workplaces employing temporary workers in 
the first place, which we can calculate as 29 percentage points. Thus, managers’ 
concern about ease of dismissal goes together with more temporary employment, 
which is in line with Hypothesis 1. 
 
Considering the other EPL indicators, the second row gives effects for the 
dummy for whether the manager feels regular worker EPL reduces employment. 
We have argued above (Table 4) that this indicator should link to concerns about 
regular EPL and hence cause higher temporary employment in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1. However, this indicator has a negative coefficient (though 
insignificant) in the column (2), contrary to this hypothesis. Nevertheless, this 
indicator behaves differently for small and large firms (see columns 4 and 5) as we 
will discuss. This said, we see that the third row’s EPL indicator for the manager 
taking professional dismisals/discipline advice links well to prevalence of temporary 
work contractst. Since the taking of this particular form of advice should indicate 
that EPL is imposing a constraint on the workplace, this finding is therefore in line 
with Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the other advice variable, for whether the 
manager takes wage or tax advice works in the opposite direction (-0.21). One 
interpretation is that this variable is picking up the wealth of the company (Table 7 
shows that it links significantly with hiring, and with being high paying). In this 
case the variable helps our Hypothesis 2, that richer, high wage companies have less 
need to resort to temporary work contracts. 
 
The fifth row shows the result for our control for temporary worker EPL. 
We see that this indicator, based on whether managers believe the labour inspector 
is an obstacle to employment on temporary work contracts is negative as expected. 
Admittedly, the effect is weak in column 3, but gains strength in later columns, 
particularly for larger firms, which may be targets of enforcement efforts. Overall, 
there is some confirmation here that our indicator variables, which are based on 
manager views, correspond with manager actions in the expected direction, which is 
encouraging. 
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 As for the wage floor variables, we see these gain significance when other 
controls are added in column 3. Our first wage floor variable indicates whether a 
workplace’s average pay equals (in fact may be below) the gross annual minimum 
wage of €11,000. Such closeness to the minimum wage floor should have a positive 
effect on the proportion of workers on temporary contracts. We see a significant 
coefficient of 0.20, but there is again evidence in columns 4 and 5 that this effect is 
stronger for the micro firms, more of whom are at the minimum wage floor.  
 
 Results for our second wage floor variable, on collective bargaining 
coverage, are shown in the next row. We see that in workplaces where a higher 
percentage of workers are paid according to the national or sectoral wage 
agreements the proportion of workers on temporary contracts decreases. The effect 
is similar in size, but opposite to the low paying workplace variable. As noted 
above, this result makes sense in the Greek environment where high coverage is 
found in better paying workplaces that can more easily afford to abide by the 
national wage agreements, and is also consistent with Hypothesis 2 on wage 
inflexibility.  
 
In columns (4) and (5) we contrast the coefficients for small and large firms. 
The final column gives the results of tests for whether these groups are significantly 
different. Significant differences appear for the first two EPL variables. We see that 
small firms are much more responsive (1.00 vs. -0.02) to managers’ perceptions 
about easier dismissal of temporary contract workers. We have already seen that 
managers of the small firms are more likely to have this perception (Table 4’s 
means show 18% vs. 9%), so the result makes sense. However, the second EPL 
variable is more difficult to understand. While the variable has the expected positive 
sign for larger firms, 0.21, indicating that the concern over EPL which this variable 
is meant to capture increases hiring of temporary contract workers, it has a 
significant negative effect (-0.27) for the small firms, whose managers are almost 
equally concerned (Table 4). This said, at least the third EPL variable, taking 
professional advice over discipline and dismissal matters, is significant and positive, 
0.28 and 0.30, for both groups. The other advice variable, on wage and tax matters, 
is also negative for both groups, though more so for the micro group. Finally, the 
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variable for whether the labour inspector is perceived as enforcing temporary 
worker restrictions has the expected negative sign, significant for the larger 
workplaces, -0.37, which is consistent with them being monitored more closely. 
 
As for the minimum wage variables, we see that these appear more 
important for the small firms whose pay is generally lower. Thus, being a low-wage 
small establishment attracts a coefficient of 0.18, compared with only 0.08 for the 
larger group. In fact, in a regression (not shown) without the wage and tax advice 
variable, the wage floor variable becomes larger and significant for the micro group, 
suggesting that small workplaces able to afford such advice are wealthier, and this 
less in need of the temporary worker buffer, in line with Hypothesis 2. We also see 
that abiding by the national agreement has more impact, --0.22 vs -0.00, for the 
small firms, again perhaps because they are generally lower paying.  
Sensitivity tests. The results of four tests are shown in Table 9. In the first column 
we show results for a weighted specification. As noted, while the weighted 
specifications might be more representative, they fail the test for normality so need 
to be taken cautiously. Since the weighting is designed to increase the importance of 
smaller workplaces, the results for the weighted model are more like Table 8’s 
column (5). The most important variables are the manager’s perception that workers 
on temporary contracts are easier to dismiss, whether the manager takes advice on 
wages or taxes, and whether the workplace is low-paying. There is nothing 
substantively different in these results except the stronger positive effect of the low-
paying workplace variable.  
 
[Table 9 near here] 
 
 In the second column we modify the dependent variable to consider only 
hires - taking temporary worker hires as a percentage of total hires - since hires are 
important for the future composition of the workforce. The pattern is generally 
similar to that for the temporary percentage as a whole, with the minimum wage 
variables more prominent.  
 
Finally, in the third and fourth columns we display results for a specification 
that excludes workers on seasonal contracts. As noted above, the seasonal 
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component of a firm’s employment mix might be more difficult to change 
(“technologically determined”), and so it is worth analysing the remaining, more 
flexible, component separately. Here, we also break down the results by small and 
large workplaces, remembering that the seasonal component is more important for 
small workplaces (Table 3). We now see that for both workplace size types, the EPL 
variables remain important for the reduced group of non-seasonal temporary 
contracts. In particular, those managers in small workplaces who prefer temporary 
contracts because dismissal is easier are much more likely to hire on a temporary 
basis (1.0
19
). Interestingly, we now have stronger results for the variable indicating 
the labour inspector is an obstacle to temporary work, -0.37 for both micro and 
larger workplaces. This stronger result for the non-seasonal temporary contract 
group suggests that the labour inspector is more likely to object to non-seasonal 
temporary work, perhaps since it has less of an “objective” justification, which is 
plausible. The minimum wage variables now are less important, suggesting that they 
work mainly via influencing seasonal work. In other words, we have a warning that 
the low-pay factor might simply be picking up the fact that low-pay workplaces are 
more seasonal (even though we are controlling for service industries, which should 
control for this factor). On the other hand, we see that the variable for taking wage 
or tax advice (which we interpreting as a type of high-paying workplace effect) 
remains negative and significant for the micro group. Hence, Hypothesis 2, on how 
high-paying workplaces need temporary contracts less retains relevance. 
 
Magnitude of effects. The tobit model’s coefficients show how a variable affects 
both the proportion of workplaces employing any temporary contract workers 
(about one-third in our sample), and the percentage of temporary contract workers 
given that any are employed (about 40%). While the double effect is complicated, 
interpretation is simplified when we remember that both effects follow the 
coefficient, that is, are positive if the coefficient is positive, and conversely. The 
issue then becomes whether the movements are economically important.  
 
 Calculations indeed suggest important movements in the temporary-
permanent contract mix if the EPL and minimum wage variables change. Our 
                                                 
19
 The large coefficient implies smaller marginal effects when we allow for the fact that only 20% of 
small firms have workers on non-seasonal temporary contracts. Moving from 0 to 1 for the dummy 
implies an increase of 12 points in the percentage of temporary contract workers, assuming any are 
employed, and an increase of about 20 points in the probability that any are employed. 
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largest coefficients are generally associated with the EPL variable based on whether 
the manager feels temporary workers are preferable because they are easier to 
dismiss. We have already seen that changing this variable from 0 to 1 (i.e., changing 
EPL from non-binding to binding) increases the percentage of workers on 
temporary contracts given that any are employed by about 13 points (using equation 
3 in Table 8). Further calculations show that the probability of any firms using 
temporary contracts would increase by about twice this amount. Of course, such a 
change in the effect of EPL is unlikely ever to be widespread, since only a small 
minority of managers (10%, see Table 4) prefer temporary contract workers because 
they are easier to dismiss. Still, the calculation shows that managers’ opinions about 
EPL can have marked effects on their HRM decisions.  
 
 Minimum wage effects are smaller. The main minimum wage floor variable 
in Table 8’s equation 3 implies that a minimum wage binding establishment has a 6 
point (=0.20×33) higher prevalence of temporary work contracts, given any such 
contracts – and also a higher probability (about 15 percentage points) of having 
these contracts. Still, while this effect is smaller, it is more likely, since many 
workplaces are subject to the minimum wage, as we have seen.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Greece has typical Mediterranean high wage and working conditions floors, though 
with widespread avoidance. Yet, even floors which are avoided may cause anxiety 
and so chill management decisions and encourage precarious temporary 
employment contracts. The purpose of this paper is to go to the micro level, using a 
survey of businesses in Thessaly to assess how Greece’s exceptional labour 
regulation affects firm decisions over the temporary-permanent contract mix. 
Essentially, we use Thessaly as a case study, and fortunately at the time we 
conducted our survey there was no question of recessionary conditions affecting the 
results. 
 
Our two hypotheses are that temporary employment increases among 
workplaces, first, that are more constrained by regular worker EPL, and second, that 
are more constrained by a high (though porous) minimum wage floor - always 
controlling for other factors. To test these hypotheses, we develop workplace-
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specific indicators of the pressures of these constraints. Our EPL indicators are 
based on manager judgements and actions such as whether the manager has recently 
taken professional advice over discipline or dismissal matters, and, in the case of 
wage floors, on information about wages paid in the workplace. Though these 
measures have to be reduced to simple zero-one dummies, in particular because of 
sparse wage information for workplaces in the Greek “grey” market, the results are 
generally consistent with our hypotheses. Indicators of both EPL and wage floor 
constraints are linked with significant upward shifts of temporary contract work in 
the employment mix, and movements that are economically important. . Hence it 
appears that Greek labour regulation, though doubtless avoided to some extent in 
many workplaces, does have a perceptible chilling effect on employment decisions; 
it is far from “obsolete”. 
 
 In sum, our results support the view stated at the outset, namely, that a firm’s 
strategic HRM decisions regarding internal versus external allocation of tasks is 
influenced by labour regulation. Our Thessally survey then provides another finding 
(following Olsen and Kelleberg 2004, and Heywood et al 2011) of temporary 
workers being used as a buffer. Indeed, for most Greek workers even at the time of 
our survey, in pre-recessionary 2006, the temporary job market was probably not 
really much of a stepping-stone to something better, but rather a long-term condition 
required if their employers were to survive. Furthermore, it is worth noting that our 
findings which come from a workplace-level database support Kahn’s (2007) result 
that EPL increases the prevalence of temporary work contracts based on his quite 
different database – aggregate cross-country data. Kugler et al (2002) also find that 
a Spanish reform lowering dismissal costs for permanent contracts (i.e. EPL) shifted 
employment of young workers from temporary to permanent contracts. That these 
different approaches reach a similar result builds confidence.  
 
 Our results also have policy implications, in that they support the 
controversial relaxation (OECD 2011a) of minimum wages and EPL that has 
occurred in Greece since our survey. This relaxation has been controversial, with 
Greece’s deputy labour minister resigning (Financial Times 2012). In particular, 
after consultation with the IMF and EU, the minimum rate set by the National 
General Collective Agreement was reduced by 22% in January 2012 (see the 
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LABREF database - European Commission 2014), and a youth sub-minimum 
(under 25s) adopted which was 32% lower. Also in 2011, extension of centrally 
negotiated collective agreements was suspended and “special firm-level 
agreements” with lower wages permitted. As regards regular worker EPL, severance 
payments and notice periods have been reduced, and the probationary period during 
which there is no right to dismissal compensation has been increased from 2 months 
to one year. As regards temporary worker EPL, in 2011 the maximum cumulated 
duration of fixed term contracts was increased from two years to three, and  the 
permitted circumstances in which they could be renewed was widened. Also, at long 
last in 2012, the onerous Temporary Work Agency regulations were relaxed 
including the requirement for capital of €176,000 (see LABREF – European 
Commission 2014). Thus agency work contracts might now grow. The faster, better 
matching possible with agencies is likely to lead to a smoother transition from 
temporary to permanent jobs. Thus, paradoxically, making temporary contracting 
easier could reduce its prevalence. 
 
Militating against these moves, however, the Labour Inspectorate is to be 
strengthened, and the electronic “labour card” (OECD 2014) concept is being 
reinforced to record each worker’s hours (and enable contracts to be more easily 
enforced and taxed). A strengthening of the Inspectorate might help raise taxes, but 
business HRM policy will also be affected, as we have shown.  
 
Some caveats are in order, since our findings are based on a first attempt to 
include micro firms in a large-scale firm survey in Greece. Our survey only covers 
one provincial area, namely Thessaly, and the evidence base should be broadened to 
cover more of Greece, including the important Athens area. Moreover, better 
“indicators” of the pressures of EPL could no doubt be devised. This said, the 
Thessaly survey results indeed imply that Greece’s system of labour regulation 
shifts firms’ personnel decisions in the direction of externalizing work.  
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Table 1: Comparative Statistics on Greek Labour Conditions and Regulation, 
mid-2000s 
  
A. Labour market conditions 
Measure Greece  OECD 
average 
Notes and Sources 
Temporary worker, 
% workforce aged 
25-54 [% of 
unskilled workers] 
10.5% 
[22.6] 
{29.3} 
9.3 
[15.3] 
(18.3} 
OECD  Statistics, (2000-06 average) – includes 
fixed term contracts, training contracts, seasonal 
workers, and agency workers 
[unskilled occupations only – OECD 2002 Table 
3.3] {unskilled occupations, 2011 – OECD 2014b 
Fig 4.8} 
Unemployment rate, 
youth 20-24 
25.4% 13.6 OECD  Statistics (2000-06 average) 
Long-term 
unemployment as % 
of total unemp. 
56.6% 33.6 OECD  Statistics, (2000-06 average).  
% firms employing 
<10  
97% 
[58] 
85 
[25] 
OECD (2011b; 2007 figure) [% of employment in 
firms<10] 
B. Measures of business regulatory environment 
World Bank, Ease of 
doing business, rank 
1-183 
109 21 WB (2007). Index based on scoring laws
a
 on the 
regulatory environment  for business, with 10 
indicator variable sets from 183 countries  1=least 
restrictive; 183=most 
Minimum wage 
2007,  ratio to full-
time median 
earnings 
49% 
 
41% 
 
Low Pay Commission (2007, Table A4.2). Note a 
22% cut in the minimum in 2012,  plus 
establishment of a youth subminimum 10% lower 
OECD employment 
protection law EPL 
index, regular 
employment, score 
0-4 
2.80 2.12 OECD  Statistics (2000-06 average) Index based on 
scoring laws protecting workers against dismissal 
with 9 indicator variables including length of notice 
period, amount of severance pay, and procedural 
inconveniences. 0=least restrictive; 6=most 
OECD restrictions 
on temporary 
employment  index, 
score 0-4 
3.89 1.54 OECD  Statistics (2000-06 average) Index based on 
scoring laws regulating  temporary employment  
with 8 indicator variables including restrictions on 
temp contracts to “objective” temp work,  on the 
number of renewals, and on the setting up of temp 
work agencies which until recently have been 
banned in Greece. 0=least restrictive; 6=most 
World Economic 
Forum, Hiring and 
firing practices, 
score 1-7 
2.9 3.6 WEF (2008). Executive opinion survey: How would 
you characterise the hiring and firing of workers in 
your country? 1=impeded by regulations; 7=flexibly 
determined by employers (Table 7.04) 
Note:  
a
The laws cover 10 business areas including starting a business, dealing with licenses, 
employing workers, registering property, getting credit, tax rates,  protecting investors, 
enforcing contracts and closing a business . Laws in each of these areas are assessed by local 
experts in relation to a standard case study. 
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Table 2: Distribution of the Survey Sample by Workplace Size  
 
How many employees 
are there in this 
workplace? 
Sample 
Weighted base  
% Number % 
% temp 
workers 
1-5 60 32 11 87 
6-10 50 27 15  10 
11-19 33 17 14 1 
20-49 34 19 16 1 
50-99 3 2 1 0.5 
100+ 6 3 29 0.5 
Total 186 100% 14% 100% 
Source: Sample figures are from the Thessaly Employment Relations Survey.  
Notes:  The weighted base is calculated from the distribution of Thessaly workplaces with personnel as 
given in the Employment Observatory Research - Informatics (PAEP, 2003) survey. The Thessaly 
survey’s oversampling of larger workplaces is seen since workplaces of size 20+ form 22% of the 
sample but only 2% of the provincial population. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Prevalence of temporary workers, by contract type 
 
Temporary contract type 
Number 
employed per 
workplace 
Percentage of average 
workplace employment 
Small,  < 10 10 and over 
Fixed term contract 0.5 0.4% 9.4% 
Seasonal contract 0.7 4.9 2.4 
Temporary agency worker 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Temporary subcontracting 0.4 0.9 3.3 
Workers subsidised by Public 
Employment Service 
0.6 4.1 0.4 
Trainee contract 0.1 0.1 2.5 
Total temporary contracts 2.3 people 10.5% 18.3% 
Memo 1:  33% of the sample of workplaces employ any temporary workers, who 
make up 14% of the sample workforce (Table 2), and in workplaces employing any, 
on average make up 41% of the workforce. 
Memo 2: temporary workers make up about 12% of new hires. 
 
Notes: Survey weights are used to calculate all percentages - see Table 1. 
Managers answered questions about numbers employed on a temporary basis (as seasonal, or fixed term 
or subcontracting workers), as trainees, as employees paid by Public Employment Service programmes, 
and as Temporary Work Agency employees. 
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Table 4: Employment Protection  
(Percent of Workplaces) 
 
 Small, 
 < 10 
10 and 
over 
Hiring/firing laws (EPL) are an obstacle to employing more 
people (% managers strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
55 47 
Temp workers are to be preferred because they are easier to 
dismiss (less EPL) (% managers strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
9 18 
Labour Inspector does not easily give permission to  employ 
temps (temp worker EPL) (% managers strongly agreeing or 
agreeing) 
23 10 
Sample numbers 99 89 
 
Notes:  Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages - see Table 1.  
 Rows are derived from questions of the form “I would like to find your views on aspects of labour 
regulation…”, scored on a likert scale ranging, 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, …, 5=strongly disagree 
 
 
Table 5: Important Employee Relations Issues 
(Percent of Workplaces) 
Employee relations issues for which professional advice† sought over 
the past 24 months 
Small, 
 < 10 
10 and 
over 
Disciplinary action 8% 26% 
Dismissals or redundancy (e.g., compensation or reinstatement) 24 47 
Fixed term contracts (e.g., new contracts or contract renewals) 23 41 
Total with any advice on the above 38 72 
 Notes: Survey weights are used to calculate all percentages. † Managers chose from a list 
including the Labour Inspectorate, Public Employent Service, Social Insurance Institute, 
Employers Association, Accountants or Lawyers – the last two being the most frequent 
 
Table 6: Wage Distribution of Employees  
 
 
Gross wage categories (in 2006 Euros 
per year) 
Small, 
 < 10 
10 and 
over 
a) Distribution  of pay 
in workplace (% of 
workers in the 
workplace)†: 
11,000 (= gross minimum wage) 64% 36% 
11,001 – 13,500  25 42 
13,501 – 18,000 7 17 
18,001 – 23,000 0.5 1.5 
23,001 – 30,000 1.3 1.5 
More than 30,000 1.5 0.5 
b) Percent of high-paying workplaces, with average pay index 
above €11,000   
41 79 
 
Notes:  Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages - see Table 1.  
† The workplace manager was asked to “Fill in this card for the percentage of your employees who 
belong to the following categories…” as shown in the table. Note the gross minimum includes 16% for 
employee social security contributions. 
†† Index calculated using midpoints of categories, with 11,000 (33000) for bottom (top) cetagory.  
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Table 7: Means and Correlations of the Main Variables 
Variables 
Means, 
small 
[larger] 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1) Percent workers temporary in workplace 
incl. fixed term, seasonal and agency  
10% 
[18]
* 1.000 
   
 
  
    
2) Manager feels temps preferable because 
easier to dismiss, 1=strongly agree/agree 
0.10   
[0.18]
* 0.246
***
 1.000 
  
 
  
    
3) Manager feels EPL reduces employment, 
1=strongly agree/agree 
0.55 
[0.47] 
-0.067 0.187
***
 1.000 
 
 
  
    
4) Manager takes dismissals or discipline 
advice  in last 2 yrs, 1=yes 
0.38 
[0.72]
*** -0.016 -0.181
** 
0.038 1.000 
 
  
    
5) Manager  takes wage or NI tax. advice  in 
last 2 yrs, 1=yes 
0.50 
[0.70
***
] 
-0.180
** 
-0.077
 
-0.040 0.520
*** 
1.000 
  
    
6) Manager feels LI an obstacle for temp 
employment, 1=strongly agree/agree 
0.23 
[0.10]
** -0.030 0.182
** 
0.196
*** 
-0.189
*** 
-0.154
** 
1.000 
 
    
7) Low pay establishment with annual wage 
index=€11,000  
0.55 
[0.19]
*** 0.185
***
 0.133
* 
0.070
 
0.009
 
-0.182
** 
0.222
*** 
1.000     
8) Percent covered by national or sectoral 
wage agreement 
0.58 
[0.86]
*** -0.070 -.020 0.090
 
0.078
 
0.092 -0.065
 
-0.144
** 
1.000    
9) Employer NI taxes a problem for 
employment, 1=strongly agree 
0.51 
[0.35]
** 0.078 0.188
*** 
0.147
** 
-0.058
 
-0.055 0.167
** 
0.209
*** 
0.053
* 
1.000   
10) Any hires in last 2 yrs, 1=yes 0.49
*** 
[0.91] 
0.077 -0.250
***
 -0.095 0.351
*** 
0.216
*** 
-0.091 -0.144
** 
0.212
***
- 0.010 1.000  
11) Manager considers workers quite or very 
committed, 1=yes 
0.76 
[0.73] 
-0.277
***
 -0.183
** 
-0.073 -0.215
*** 
-0.096 0.121
* 
-0.090
 
-0.286
*** 
-0.031
 
-0.188
***
 1.000 
12) Number of employees 4 
[21] 
0.028 -0.001 -0.039 0.072 0.052 -0.058 -0.106
 
0.088
 
0.050
 
0.131
*
 -0.052 
 
Notes: Survey weights are used to calculate all statistics. ***, **, * signify 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. In the column of means, significance levels are for the 
comparison of means for small workplaces (< 10 employees) versus larger. 
 39 
Table 8: Regressions for Temporary Worker Employment 
 
Dependent variable: Percent of temporary workers employed at the workplace 
(includes fixed-term, seasonal work, temporary subcontracting plus trainees and subsidised workers, see 
Table 2). 
Independent variable  Unweighted Coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 
   10 and 
 over 
small 
(<10) 
Differ-
ence 
1) dummy for manager feels temps 
preferable because easier to dismiss 
 0.32
** 
0.39
***
 -0.02 1.00
*** *** 
2) dummy for manager feels EPL 
reduces employment 
 -0.15
 
-0.10 0.21
** 
-0.27
* ** 
3) dummy for manager takes 
dismissals/discipline advice  in last 2 yrs  
 0.27
*** 
0.24
** 
0.28
** 
0.30
** 
insig 
4) dummy for manager takes wage or NI 
tax. advice  in last 2 yrs 
 -0.18 -0.23
** 
-0.06 -0.49
*** ** 
5) dummy for manager feels labour 
inspector  an obstacle for temps  
 -0.22 -0.14 -0.37
** 
-0.36
 ** 
6) dummy for low wage estab. (av. 
wage <= €11,000/yr) 
 0.10 0.20
**
 0.08
 
0.18
 
insig 
7) proportion covered by national or 
sectoral wage agreement  
 -0.15 -0.21
**
 0.00 -0.22 insig 
dummy for manager considers 
workers quite or very committed  
0.02  0.02** 0.03 0.01 insig 
dummy for any family employees -0.04  -0.09 0.01
 
-0.06
 
insig 
dummy for any part-time workers -0.18  -0.19
* 
-0.24
** 
-0.33
* 
insig 
dummy for any hires in last 2 yrs 0.28
** 
 0.33
**
 0.23 0.51
*** 
insig 
number workers  employed x 10 0.02
*** 
 0.02
**
 0.03
***
 -0.03
 
insig 
McFadden† pseudo R2 0.123 0.059 0.225 0.613 0.376  
F test of joint significance
 
2.11
*** 
1.88
* 
3.31
*** 
7.52
*** 
4.88
** 
 
Observations (uncensored) 188 (62) 188 (62) 185 (61) 87 (35) 98 (26)  
Notes: The regression analysis was performed using Stata. 
Regressions also control for percent young and old in establishment, non-routine subcontracting, past use 
of flexible workers, and industry (up to 9 dummies).  ***, **, * signify 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, using robust standard errors . Tobit coefficients have to be multiplied by the proportion of non-
censored observations , approximately one-third (=62/188), to give effects conditional on temp being 
positive.. .  
† pseudo R2 = 1 – Lfit/L0 where L fit is the log likelihood of the fitted model, and Lo is the log likelihood of 
an intercept-only model;   
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Table 9: Sensitivity Tests 
(Dependent variable: Percent employed on temporary contracts – alternative definitions) 
 
Independent variable 
All temps, 
as Table 
8, col (3), 
weighted 
Temps as % 
of hires, 
unweighted 
 
Temps excluding 
seasonal, unweighted 
10 and 
over 
Small 
(<10) 
1) dummy for manager feels temps 
preferable because easier to dismiss 
0.53
** 
-0.16 -0.13
 
1.0
*** 
2) dummy for manager feels EPL reduces 
employment 
-0.14
 
-0.45
* 
0.20
* 
-0.35
**
. 
3) dummy for manager takes 
dismissals/discipline advice  in last 2 yrs  
0.09
 
0.88
*** 
0.30
** 
0.26
** 
4) dummy for manager takes wage or NI tax. 
advice  in last 2 yrs 
-0.29
** 
-0.60
** 
-0.00
 
-0.39
*** 
5) dummy for manager feels labour inspector  
an obstacle for temp contracts 
-0.08
 
-0.49
 
-0.37
** 
-0.37
* 
6) dummy for low pay workplace, average 
wage <=€11,000 per year 
0.32
*** 
0.52
** 
0.10
 
-0.16 
7) Proportion covered by national & sectoral 
wage agreement  
-0.20 -0.68
*** 
-0.00 -0.13 
dummy for manager considers workers quite 
or very committed  
-0.18 -0.26
 
0.07 -0.11 
dummy for any family employees 0.23 -0.33
 
-0.17
 
-0.15 
dummy for any part-time workers -0.32
** 
-0.31 -0.24
** 
0.46
** 
dummy for any redundancies in last 2 yrs 0.01 0.01
 
-0.18 -0.37
* 
dummy for any hires in last 2 yrs 0.26
** 
NA 0.06 0.94
*** 
number workers  employed 0.01
 
0.02
 
0.02
** 
-0.01
 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
McFadden† pseudo R2 0.217 0.243 0.438 0.616 
F test of joint significance
 
7.21
*** 
5.97
*** 
4.39
*** 
5.11
*** 
Notes: see Table  9 
 
